Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

State of Utah v. Dennis Shoulderblade : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; David B. Thompson; Assistant Attorney General.
G. Fred Metos; Stephen R. McCaughey; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Shoulderblade, No. 900288 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2678

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

./.sO
IN THE UTAH COURT t"F APPEALS

~~'—~

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900288-CA

v.
Category No. 2

DENNIS SHOULDERBLADE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

ON REMAND FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT;
ORIGINAL APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS OF
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE
FELONIES; IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF, PRESIDING

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

FILED
G. FRED METOS ( 2 2 5 0 )
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY ( 2 1 4 9 )

Utah

Court of Appeals
Utanoouuu KK

72 East Fourth South, Suite 330

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

R

, jgcjg

Attorneys for Appellant
J.
f

MaryT Noonan
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900288-CA

v.
Category No. 2

DENNIS SHOULDERBLADE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
ON REMAND FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT;
ORIGINAL APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS OF
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE
FELONIES; IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF, PRESIDING

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

G. FRED METOS (2250)
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY (2149)
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ii
1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS
OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S
CONSENT TO SEARCH SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED
UNDER THE EXPLOITATION PRONG OF THE ARROYO
TEST

6

A.

Clarification of Arroyo Test in Thurman . . . .

7

B.

The Instant Case

CONCLUSION

12
13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990)

10-11

State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)

3, 5-7, 12-13

State v. Shoulderblade. No. 900228-CA (Utah App.
Mar. 12, 1992)

3-4, 6, 12

State v. Shoulderblade. No. 920239 (Utah Jan. 5, 1993)

3

State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991),
cert, granted, No. 920218 (Utah Feb. 5, 1993)
9-11
State v. Small. 829 P.2d 129 (Utah App.), cert.
denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992)
3-4, 9-12
State v. Small, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)
9, 11
State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18
(Utah Jan. 7, 1993)
1, 5-7, 9, 12-13
United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 (10th
Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 486 U.S. 1054
(1988)
10, 12
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1992)

1,2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1992)

1

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900288-CA

v.
Category No. 2

DENNIS SHOULDERBLADE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute (methamphetamine
and marijuana), second and third degree felonies, under Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1992), and possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, under Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly ruled that evidence seized pursuant to defendant's
voluntary consent to search was admissible, even though the
consent followed an illegal roadblock stop.
The trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness.
State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah Jan. 7, 1993).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with one count of
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992), and
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, second and third degree felonies, under Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1992) (R. 150-51).
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress, based on its conclusion that the roadblock stop of his
car was lawful and defendant had consented to a search of the car
(see Ruling, R. 55-58; attached as Appendix A ) , a jury found
defendant guilty as charged (R. 26, 55-58, 88-131, 197-99).

The

court sentenced defendant to a term of not less than one nor more
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for the second degree
felony, and prison terms not to exceed five years for the two
third degree felonies, all terms to run concurrently (R. 261).
The court then stayed execution of the sentence pending
defendant's completion of a previously imposed sentence in
Montana (R. 269).
Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should
have granted his motion to suppress because the roadblock stop

2

violated the Fourth Amendment,1
unpublished opinion.

This Court affirmed in an

State v. Shoulderblade, No. 900228-CA (Utah

App. Mar. 12, 1992) (unpublished) (attached as Appendix B). The
Court held that, although the roadblock stop was
unconstitutional, defendant had not presented a basis for
reversal because he did not challenge the trial court's ruling
that the incriminating evidence had been seized pursuant to
defendant's voluntary consent to a search of the car. j[d, at 34.

Nor had he made a nonattenuation argument under State v.

Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).

Id. at 3.

Compare State v.

Small, 829 P.2d 129, 131-32 (Utah App.) (where defendant's
codefendant raised the nonattenuation argument and obtained a
reversal), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
With new counsel, defendant filed a petition for
certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court.

He argued that certiorari

should be granted to review his claims of plain error and
ineffective assistance of counsel concerning this Court's refusal
to address the attenuation issue and former counsel's failure to
raise it.

The State agreed with defendant's ineffectiveness

claim, and, pursuant to defendant's motion for summary
disposition, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case to
this Court for consideration of the attenuation issue.

State v.

Shoulderblade, No. 920239, Order (Utah Jan. 5, 1993) (attached as

1

Although defendant was tried jointly with a codefendant,
Lemuel Small, defendants elected to take separate appeals. See
State v. Small, 829 P.2d 129 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d
1042 (Utah 1992).
3

Appendix C ) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Court summarized the facts of this case in its
prior opinion:
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway
Patrol, in conjunction with the Millard
County Sheriff's office, conducted a
roadblock in Millard County, Utah, on a
section of Interstate 15. Approximately
fifteen officers were assigned to operate the
roadblock. They were instructed to check for
driver's licenses and vehicle registration.
In addition, the officers were told to
further question any one who looked
suspicious.
During the roadblock, all vehicles were
stopped, including the vehicle Shoulderblade
was driving. Lemuel Small was a passenger in
that vehicle. Officer Jeffrey Whatcott, who
executed the stop, testified that both Small
and Shoulderblade produced valid
identification. The vehicle was not
registered to either Small or Shoulderblade.
Small told the officer that the vehicle
belonged to a friend of his. The officer
sought confirmation of registration through
radio dispatch. He also asked Small and
Shoulderblade if there were any firearms,
alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Both
replied in the negative. Officer Whatcott
then requested permission to search the
vehicle. Small consented. Both Small and
Shoulderblade were arrested after a
substantial quantity of drugs, drug
paraphernalia, firearms, and cash was found
in the vehicle. Officer Whatcott continued
to search the vehicle, and upon smelling
marijuana, opened the trunk of the vehicle
and discovered more drugs and paraphernalia.
State v. Shoulderblade, Case No. 900288-CA, slip op. at 1-2 (Utah
App. Mar. 12, 1992) (unpublished).

See also State v. Small, 829

P.2d 129, 130 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1992).
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant does not challenge the voluntariness of the
consent he gave for a police search of his car after he had been
stopped at an illegal roadblock.

Instead, he argues that his

consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop to
be valid under the exploitation prong of the two-part test
adopted in State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
Defendant's argument does not fully consider the
clarification of Arroyo's exploitation prong the supreme court
recently set forth in State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18
(Utah Jan. 7, 1993).

There, the court made clear that Arroyo's

primary goal was deterrence of police misconduct, and that the
relative egregiousness of the prior police misconduct is the most
significant factor to be considered in deciding whether a
subsequent consent was the result of police exploitation.

The

other factors identified in Arroyo for consideration of the
exploitation question, temporal proximity and intervening
circumstances between the police misconduct and the consent, are
insignificant if the misconduct was not flagrant or purposeful.
On the other hand, if the misconduct is egregious, the temporal
proximity and intervening circumstances factors are dispositive.
In the instant case, because there was no state or
federal case on the books that would have made clear to the
officers that their roadblock was unconstitutional, the police
misconduct was not flagrant or purposeful.

Therefore, it is

insignificant that but a short period of time elapsed between the
illegal stop and the consent and that no intervening

-5-

circumstances were present.

Under Thurman's clarification of

Arroyo, defendant's voluntary consent was not obtained by police
exploitation.

Thus, the trial court correctly denied defendant's

motion to suppress.

His conviction should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S
CONSENT TO SEARCH SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED
UNDER THE EXPLOITATION PRONG OF THE ARROYO
TEST
The order from the supreme court requires this Court to
consider "the issue of whether there was sufficient attenuation
between the illegal roadblock stop and a voluntary consent to
search, so as to preclude the application of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule" (Appendix C).

Defendant argues that his

consent to the search of the car lacked attenuation from the
initial, illegal roadblock stop2, and therefore the evidence
seized was inadmissible under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990).

In its pre-Arroyo ruling on defendant's motion to

suppress, the trial court did not address the attenuation
question because it held that the roadblock was legal (see
Ruling, attached as Appendix A).

The attenuation issue presents

a question of law for this Court to decide de novo.

State v.

Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah Jan. 7, 1993).
Defendant's argument fails because, in analyzing the
attenuation question under Arroyo and Thurman. he does not fully

2

In defendant's original appeal to this Court, the State
conceded that the roadblock violated the Fourth Amendment.
Shoulderblade, slip op. at 3.

-6-

consider the supreme court's clarification of the exploitation
prong of the test it adopted in Arroyo.

Applying Thurman's

clarification of the exploitation prong to this case, the
evidence was lawfully seized from defendant's car pursuant to his
consent.
A.

Clarification of Arroyo Test in Thurman

In Arroyo, the court "held that a defendant's consent
to a search following illegal police activity is valid under the
Fourth Amendment only if both of the following tests are met:
(i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii) the consent was
not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality."
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 20 (citing Arroyo, 796 P.2d at
688).

In Thurman, the court clarified how the exploitation

(attenuation) prong of the Arroyo test is to be applied.
The Thurman court began by stating that "Arroyo's
primary goal was to deter the police from engaging in illegal
conduct even though that conduct may be followed by a voluntary
consent to the subsequent search."

203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21.

Having identified the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
as the basis for Arroyo's exploitation prong, the court
reiterated the factors to be considered in assessing the validity
of a consent to search that follows illegal police conduct:
"[(1)] 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,'
[(2)] the 'temporal proximity' of the illegality and the consent,
and [(3)] 'the presence of intervening circumstances.'"
(citations omitted).

Ibid,

The court then discussed each factor,

emphasizing the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.

-7-

The court made clear that the "purpose and flagrancy"
factor is the most significant of the three because it "directly
relates to the deterrent value of suppression."
omitted).

Ibid, (citations

Therefore, the first task under the exploitation prong

is to determine the nature and degree of the police illegality
based on a continuum of "flagrancy" or "purpose."
To put the continuum in perspective, it must first be
recognized that "'[tjhe deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful,
or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the
defendant of some right.'11

.Id. at 22 (quoting Brown v. Illinois,

422 U.S. 590, 612 (Powell, J., concurring), in turn quoting
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)).

Thus, at one end

of the continuum is police misconduct that is "flagrantly
abusive, [such that] there is greater likelihood that the police
engaged in the conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives,"
or instances where "the purpose of the misconduct was to achieve
the consent."

Ibid, (citations omitted).

In such cases,

"suppressing the resulting evidence will have a greater
likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in the future."

Ibid,

(citation and footnote omitted).
At the other extreme are instances where "the police
had no 'purpose' in engaging in the misconduct[•]

[F]or example,

if the illegality arose because [a court] later invalidated a
statute on which the police had relied in good faith[,]
suppression would have no deterrent value."
omitted).
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taint.
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Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), and
per se unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution because there was no statutory authority for such a
roadblock.

808 P.2d at 142, 145-50.

Small simply held that the

roadblock there was unconstitutional under Sitz; it did not reach
the state constitutional question.

829 P.2d at 131 & n.2.

In both Sims and Small, the defendants gave consent to
a search of their vehicles after being stopped at police
roadblocks which were later ruled illegal by this Court.

At the

time the roadblocks were set up, however, no decision from either
the Utah appellate courts or the United States Supreme Court had
directly ruled on the legality of such roadblocks.
Sims, 808 P.2d at 142-50.

See generally

In fact, the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals had held that police roadblocks for the purpose of
checking driver's license and vehicle registration were
constitutional.

United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1392

(10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988).

It was not

until Sitz and Sims were issued that it became clear the
roadblocks at issue were unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 14. Thus, the roadblocks could
not fairly be characterized as flagrant violations of the federal
or state constitutions.
While it is not clear that the Sims panel actually
concluded that the police misconduct was flagrant, it seemed to
suggest that the roadblock constituted a flagrant constitutional
violation because (1) "[t]he troopers each had years of law
enforcement experience, and [could] properly be charged with
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Given Arroyo's ambiguous discussion of the exploitation
prong, it was not unreasonable for the Sims and Park panels to
interpret Arroyo as requiring a clean break in the chain of
events between a prior police illegality (whether or not
flagrant) and the subsequent consent for the consent to be valid.
However, Thurman clearly rejected the Sims/Park approach.
Defendant's reliance on Sims and Small as controlling authority
is therefore wrong.

Insofar as Sims held that a consent search

is automatically invalidated if the voluntary consent is closely
connected in time and by circumstance to the prior police
illegality, it is no longer good law. As Thurman makes clear, if
the violation by the police is not flagrant or purposeful,
temporal proximity or the absence of intervening circumstances
between the illegality and the consent is not significant.
B.

The Instant Case

Here, the roadblock was set up to check driver's
licenses and vehicle registrations.

Shoulderblade, slip op. at

1; Small, 829 P.2d at 130. The officers were also instructed to
further question anyone who looked suspicious.

Ibid.

Because

Sitz and Sims had not been issued at the time of this roadblock,
and the Tenth Circuit had upheld a driver's license/vehicle
registration roadblock in United States v. Corral, the officers
could not have reasonably known that their roadblock was
unconstitutional.

Therefore, the officers' activity could not be

characterized as a flagrant or purposeful constitutional
violation.

This case is akin to one in which "the illegality

arose because [a court] later invalidated a statute on which the
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoi ng arguments, this Court should
a 11 i iriTi ciet enclant • s coi I i, i c t:i c i I
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J__

day of April, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
(J
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

Case Number

86-2413

)

vs.

)

LEMUEL THOMAS SMALL, and DENNIS
6H0ULDERBLADE,

)

RULING

)

Defendants.

)
********

This matter came before the Court on the 4th day of
August, 1989 on defendant's motion to suppress.

The parties

proffered certain testimony, a witness was called and testified,
and counsel presented their arguments to the Court.

The Court,

having taken the matter under advisement, and having diligently
considered all of the evidence before it, now enters this:
RULING
On September

29, 198B, the Utah Highway

Patrol, in

conjunction with the Millard County Sheriff's Office conducted a
roadblock on a flat section of Interstate Highway 15, south of
Fillmore.

Notice of the checkpoint was duly given one week

before in the local newspaper of general circulation.

Prior to

setting the roadblock, the officers were briefed and instructed
to check for proper driver's license and vehicle registration.
Appropriate signs were placed, announcing the checkpoint at some
distance in front of the block.

During the roadblock, all cars were stopped.
to the roadblock, defendants were stopped.

Pursuant

During the stop, the

officer present observed defendant Small shove s plastic bag
between the front seats of the ear.

The officer checked both

defendants' identification and determined that the car was not
registered to either defendant. While awaiting confirmation from
dispatch regarding registration, the officer asked defendants
whether there were any firearms, alcohol, or drugs in the car.
The response was in the negative.

The officer then requested

permission to search the vehicle. Consent was given.
As defendant Shoulderblade exited the car, the officer
noticed a gun under the front seat.
passenger
quantity

compartment of
of

firearms.

drugs,
In

Subsequent search of the

the vehicle revealed

drug

the course

paraphernalia,
of

the

a

money,

search

of

substantial
and

the

loaded

passenger

compartment, the officer asked defendants if they knew anything
about the firearms or the drugs.
negative.

Defendants responded in the

They were subsequently arrested

and were apprised of

their rights before any further attempt at questioning.
As the officer searched the passenger compartment of
the vehicle, he smelled what he believed to be raw marijuana.
subsequently,

opened

the

trunk

and

found

more

drugs

He
and

paraphernalia.
The evidence presented indicates that the roadblock was
properly instituted at a fixed point as indicated in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).

The checkpoint was located in

• flat area end was highly visible.

By allowing officers to

check licenses and vehicle registration, advanced a legitimate
governmental purpose as required in United States v. McFavden.
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
As

further

required

in

McFavden,

there

was

no

discretion on the part of officers stopping the cars—all were
required to stop. While there is some caestion as to whether all
of the large trucks were stopped at the roadblock, there was no
clear testimony that they were not stopped.

The court notes that

the Tenth Circuit has ruled that letting certain vehicles through
the roadblock unchecked is not, per se, an unlawful practice.
United States v. Corral. 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1987).

In any

event, it is undisputed that all passenger vehicles were stopped.
Questioning

as

part

of

an

initial

stop

does

not

normally rise to the level of a custodial interrogation.

The

Utah

not

Supreme Court

has

held

that

Miranda

warnings

are

required for investigation and interview pursuant to determining
whether a crime has been committed.

Salt Lake City v. earner,

664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983).
The factors required for a Miranda warning under earner
are not present.

Here questioning as to the contents of the car

was made as the officer awaited information from the dispatcher
relative to vehicle registration.

Questioning made during the

search of the vehicle was not accusatory.

Any interrogation if

it can be called that was brief and informal.
1171.

See earner, at

The defendants were only detained after facts came to

light during the check that created a reasonable suspicion that
the occupants were engaged in some criminal activity (earner).
The uncon trover ted testimony is that the defendants were properly
advised of their rights before further attempts at questioning.
All of the above factors»
location,

legitimate

purpose

of

notice of the stop, its

the

stop,

training

of

the

officers, the minimal intrusion by the officers unless there was
an articulateble and reasonable suspicion,

establish a minimum

of public inconvenience.
Defendants

gave

permission

Consent was never withdrawn.

to

search

the

vehicle.

As such, the subsequent search of

the trunk was reasonable and proper.

Even if the consent was

somehow defective, (and there is no evidence that this is the
case) this court believes that due to the evidence found in the
passenger compartment and the smell of marijuana, the officer had
probable cause to search the trunk space.

See State v. Earl, 716

P.2d 603 (Utah 1986).
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the
vehicle

stop,

administered.

search,

and

subsequent

arrest

were

properly

The Court therefore denies defendants' motion to

suppress.
DATED at Provo, Utah this 'g- t

day of August, 1989.

GEORGE W, BALLIF, JUDGE
cc: Dexter Anderson
Milton Harmon
Sumner Hatch
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon.
JACKSON, Judge:
This is an appeal from a trial court's denial of appellant
Dennis Shoulderblade's motion to suppress certain evidence that
was obtained as a result of a roadblock and subsequent search of
the vehicle he was driving. We affirm,
Shoulderblade has not challenged the trial court's findings
of fact on appeal* Therefore, we adopt the following facts.
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol, in conjunction
with the Millard County Sheriff's office, conducted a roadblock
in Millard County, Utah, on a section of Interstate 15.
Approximately fifteen officers were assigned to operate the
roadblock. They were instructed to check for driver's licenses
and vehicle registration. In addition, the officers were told to
further question anyone who looked suspicious.
During the roadblock, all vehicles were stopped, including
the vehicle Shoulderblade was driving. Lemuel Small was a
passenger in that vehicle. Officer Jeffrey Whatcott, who
executed the stop, testified that both Small and Shoulderblade
produced valid identification. The vehicle was not registered to
either Small or Shoulderblade. Small told the officer that the

vehicle belonged to a friend of his. The officer sought
confirmation of registration through radio dispatch. He also
asked Small and Shoulderblade if there were any firearms,
alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Both replied in the negative.
Officer Whatcott then requested permission to search the vehicle.
Small consented. Both Small and Shoulderblade were arrested
after a substantial quantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia,
firearms, and cash was found in the vehicle. Officer Whatcott
continued to search the vehicle, and upon smelling marijuana,
opened the trunk of the vehicle and discovered more drugs and
paraphernalia.
Small and Shoulderblade were charged in an amended
information with several counts of possession of controlled
substances. Both defendants filed motions to suppress the
evidence that was found in the vehicle. The motions were based
on the alleged illegality of the roadblock. The trial court
concluded that the roadblock was instituted in a lawful manner.
The court further held that Miranda warnings were not required
under the facts before it, and that any interrogation that took
place was brief and informal. The uncontroverted testimony
indicated that both Small and Shoulderblade were properly advised
of their rights before further attempts at questioning them took
place.
The trial court made the following findings: Small and
Shoulderblade consented to the search of the vehicle; the consent
was never withdrawn; even if the consent were found to be somehow
defective, there was probable cause to search the trunk of the
vehicle. Based on the foregoing, the court denied the motions to
suppress•
Small and Shoulderblade were tried by a jury on February 16,
1990. The jury convicted Small of one count of possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. 5 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana), a second and a third
degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
(Supp. 1988).l Shoulderblade appeals the trial court's denial of
his motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the
search.
Shoulderblade first asserts that the roadblock at which he
was stopped violated his constitutional right against
1. The current versions of the statutes under which Shoulderblade
was convicted are codified at Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (Supp.
1992).
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unreasonable searches and seizures. The State concedes that the
roadblock in question does not pass muster under the federal
constitution, and therefore we reverse the trial court's
determination that the roadblock was conducted in a legal manner.
Shoulderblade did not argue before the trial court, or
before this court, that the consent given to search the vehicle
was involuntary, or that it was insufficiently attenuated from
the illegal roadblock to justify the search. As the State points
out, while a nonattenuation argument was unavailable to
Shoulderblade in the trial court, because, as acknowledged in
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending,
"then-standing decisions effectively held that a non-coerced
search consent, by itself, purged the taint of a primary
illegality," id. at 150, the argument was available when this
case was briefed for appeal. However, Shoulderblade has failed
to articulate such an argument before this court.
Therefore, in light of the trial courts uncontested finding
that consent was given to search the vehicle, we affirm the trial

900288-CA
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court's denial of Shoulderblade^s motion to suppress on the
ground that the challena^d pviriAirA WAR obtained during a valid
consent search.2

Norman H. Jacksoi^Oudge ^

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

2. Shoulderblade also asserts because the evidence was seized as
a result of interrogations which violated his right against selfincrimination, the evidence is inadmissible. Nothing in his
statement of facts, however, comes close to describing any
interrogation that might have taken place, or what, if any
incriminating statements were obtained therefrom. Further,
the trial court found that the questioning that took place during
the search of the vehicle was Mnot accusatory,* and that the
uncontroverted testimony indicated that Shoulderblade was advised
of his constitutional rights following his arrest. Shoulderblade
has not cited us to anywhere in the record that disputes this
finding.
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APPENDIX C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Dennis Shoulderblade,
Defendant and Petitioner.

Supreme Court No. 920239

ORDER
Defendant's motion to summarily reverse the Court of
Appeal's decision in this case is granted, and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings.
The Court of Appeals is directed to invite the
parties to brief the issue of whether there was sufficient
attenuation between the illegal roadblock stop and a
voluntary consent to search, so as to preclude the
application of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, and to
issue its ruling on the attenuation question.
Dated this fifth day of January, 1993.
BY THE COURT

Gordon R. Hall
Chief Justice

